Offsets, and in particular international offsets, have been advanced as an important tool in climate policy, capable of significantly reducing the costs of emissions reductions. As attention turns to the existing Clean Air Act as a potential vehicle for general reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, an important question is whether regulation under the statute is compatible with international offsets. This paper analyzes the regulatory programs under the Clean Air Act that are the most likely candidates for greenhouse gas regulation and concludes that many of them are legally incompatible with international offsets. Those programs that might permit use of international offsets have other problems that make them unpopular choices for greenhouse gas regulation. To the extent that Clean Air Act regulation depends on state action, state law and constitutional limitations appear to offer more barriers than opportunities for use of international offsets. These conclusions have implications for the costs and flexibility of climate policy under the Clean Air Act.
Introduction
With Congress's failure to date to create comprehensive climate legislation, attention has turned to moves by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the existing Clean Air Act (CAA). Among the many questions raised by this shift is whether and how policy instruments such as emissions trading and offsets can be incorporated into CAA regulation. This paper will briefly analyze whether that statute provides any plausible basis for use of international GHG offsets for stationary sources. 1 The foundation for almost all of the analysis presented here is the CAA itself-no federal court rulings and very few scholarly analyses have addressed this question.
The paper briefly discusses offsets as a policy mechanism and the history of their use within the CAA, before detailing the potential for incorporation of offsets into various CAA programs that might plausibly be used for regulation of GHGs.
For various reasons discussed in detail below, none of these programs seems readily compatible with use of international offsets in the GHG context. Those programs that might be compatible are a poor fit for GHG regulation generally. Programs that are better candidates for GHG regulation contain statutory restrictions that require, at best, creative and legally questionable reinterpretation in order to be compatible with international offsets. State-level regulation under the CAA faces similar challenges and restrictions along with additional barriers that may exist in state law. * Visiting Scholar, Resources for the Future. I thank Richard Morgenstern for asking the question that inspired this paper, and Art Fraas for helpful comments and advice. All remaining errors are my own. 1 That is, electricity generation plants, industrial facilities, etc. Emissions from vehicles-mobile sources-are regulated under separate CAA provisions and are not discussed here.
Offsets and the Clean Air Act

Offsets as a Policy Mechanism
Offsets are an environmental policy mechanism in which an emitter of a pollutant may increase emissions or avoid required reductions in emissions by committing to reductions in emissions elsewhere. This commitment-the offset-may come from the same facility, a different facility under the same owner, or as a result of a contractual agreement between different emitters. The general result of offset use is that emissions in the relevant area are at least no greater than before their use, but that tradeoffs are possible between various emitting activities and facilities. Relative to a ban on any emissions increases or individually mandated emissions reductions, offsetting should be able to achieve equivalent environmental results at lower cost since higher-value uses of a limited emissions "resource" can be prioritized.
Offsets have been recognized as a useful policy mechanism for some time, and have been a part of environmental regulation in the United States for more than 30 years. They have attracted increased interest recently due to their potentially large role in controlling the costs of GHG emissions reductions. 2 Some industries and countries are able to reduce GHG emissions more cheaply than others. To the extent that emissions cuts beyond those mandated by regulations can be traded as offsets, the global cost of GHG reductions can be substantially decreased. Though some problems exist with accurately determining whether reductions are "additional" (whether they go beyond what would have been achieved anyway), offsets are generally recognized as a key part of any international effort to reduce GHG emissions.
International offsets have figured prominently in climate legislation under consideration in Congress. 3 Because this legislation has stalled, however, attention has partially shifted to potential regulation of GHGs by the EPA under the existing CAA.
Existing Offset Programs Under the Clean Air Act
Offsets have been a formal part of EPA regulation at least since the 1977 amendments to the CAA. Under the statute, the EPA is charged with setting uniform national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). 4 Areas that fail to meet these standards are designated as nonattainment areas. 5 Such areas are subject to strict regulation, including an effective ban on construction of major new facilities or major modifications to existing facilities that emit pollutants for which the area is above the NAAQS-unless emissions from the new or modified facility are offset. 6 The Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD There are also significant conceptual and practical problems with regulation of GHGs under the NAAQS (as would be required for any areas to be in nonattainment and therefore eligible for use of ERC offsets). Few who have studied CAA GHG regulation favor a NAAQS approach. Among the largest of these conceptual problems is that the globally uniform nature of GHG pollution would require the entire United States to be either in attainment or nonattainment, and that, as a result, different rules for attainment and nonattainment areas would have little meaning.
If GHGs were regulated under the NAAQS and the standard set at a level placing the entire United States in nonattainment, some nationwide offsetting would be possible. Emissions of GHGs from any area would affect compliance with the NAAQS everywhere else in the country due to atmospheric mixing of GHGs, and any additional reductions in GHG emissions would therefore qualify for ERCs which could be used anywhere in the country. Although this would undoubtedly be useful, it does nothing to allow the use of international offsets. As mentioned above, areas outside the United States cannot be in nonattainment even if their emissions contribute to U.S. concentrations. In this respect, the CAA is designed to deal with local or at most national pollution problems-not global pollutants like GHGs.
If GHGs were not regulated under the NAAQS, or the NAAQS set at a level that put the entire United States in attainment, permitting requirements would still exist but be subject to a different standard. All stationary sources that emit pollutants regulated under the CAA are subject to NSR when they are initially built or undergo major modification. 12 Outside of nonattainment areas, this permit requires the use of "best available control technology" or BACT. 13 The EPA is charged with determining whether a facility seeking a permit has implemented BACT. This determination is case-by-case, but is guided by a "clearinghouse" set up by the EPA to provide information on technologies that meet BACT and other standards required in the CAA. 14 Could the EPA define BACT so as to include international offsets? If so, no NAAQS regulation would be necessary (at least for offsets to be brought into CAA regulation).
Unfortunately, the answer seems to be no. BACT is defined in the CAA as
[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility, which the permitting authority . . . determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovate fuel combustion techniques for control of each pollutant. 15 12 CAA §165(a).
13 CAA §165(a)(4).
14 EPA, RACT/BACT/LAER Clearinghouse (RBLC) (available online at < http://cfpub.epa.gov/RBLC/htm/bl02.cfm>).
15 CAA §169(3).
There are two ways in which this definition appears to block incorporation of offsets into BACT. First, the language strongly implies that BACT is a purely technological standard.
References to "processes . . . methods, systems, and techniques" and the specific examples given (such as "fuel cleaning") indicate that technology, not trading or offsetting, is to be the basis of BACT. One might argue that offsets are a "method" or a "system" of controlling emissions, but this may stretch the meaning of these terms beyond their breaking point in the context of the statute.
A larger problem for offsets is the apparent requirement that BACT must control emissions from the facility seeking a permit. BACT is defined as being based on reductions in emissions of pollutants "emitted from . . . any major facility" that the EPA determines is "achievable for such facility." Reductions in emissions at other facilities appear to be explicitly excluded.
One possible way to escape this requirement stems from the fact that BACT is not a specific requirement that a given technology or "method" be implemented, but a standard based on the emissions reductions that identified technologies make possible. Even if offsets cannot be considered when BACT is set, therefore, it might be possible for them to be considered in determining whether BACT is met. There is no apparent precedent for this, however. If it were legal, one would expect domestic offsetting programs under BACT for pollutants already regulated under the CAA, and no such programs exist.
Finally, even if international offsets could be used to fulfill NSR requirements, new and modified facilities would still face requirements under CAA NSPS. For reasons discussed in the next section, it appears unlikely that offsets could be used under NSPS regulation. NSR offsets might therefore have limited value even if they could be legally implemented.
Offsets Under Clean Air Act Performance Standards (NSPS)
Given the problems mentioned above with regulation of GHGs under the NAAQS is helpful to future efforts to create emissions trading programs under NSPS regulation, however-there is no such precedent for offsets, though trading and offsets are conceptually similar in many respects. 27 International offsets present a further problem in that international emissions sources are not mentioned at all in §111-there is similarly no precedent for any consideration of international emissions in NSPS programs. While the legal issues are complex and impossible to predict with certainty, it appears unlikely that an EPA effort to incorporate international offsets into NSPS GHG regulation would survive challenge in court. It cannot be ruled out, however, and at least stands a chance of being permissible.
Offsets Under More Speculative Clean Air Act Programs
Some have proposed regulating GHGs under rarely used sections of the CAA that, due to their brevity, may provide the EPA with greater regulatory discretion. The two CAA sections most often proposed are §115, 28 governing international emissions, and §615, 29 part of the CAA's Title VI provisions aimed at pollutants that damage the ozone layer. The chief attraction of regulating GHGs under these provisions, as opposed to the much more detailed provisions governing CAA programs like the NSPS and NAAQS that are actually in use, is the fact that they have almost none of the restrictions, definitions, and requirements that limit EPA discretion.
Using §115 or §615 as the primary vehicle for GHG regulation under the CAA might allow the EPA to incorporate international offsets into GHG regulation-there is little in these CAA provisions to prevent it. The problem with general regulation under these provisions is that it is legally untested and likely to be viewed by courts with skepticism. As I have written elsewhere, such sweeping regulation under §115 (or §615) may not be legal. 30 Courts usually 27 To my knowledge there is no court ruling establishing that NSPS regulation can include emissions trading. The program for waste incinerators gives regulatory precedent, and the DC Circuit's decision not to rule the practice impermissible in reviewing the Clean Air Mercury Rule are relevant, but do create legal precedent for the practice. Stare decisis will therefore play no role in any future action challenging a broad interpretation of "standard of performance" in §111, whether dealing with emissions trading, offsets, or both. disfavor attempts by agencies to use short, vague statutory language to justify sweeping regulatory changes. As Justice Scalia has put it, "Congress does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes." 31 Such broad regulation of GHG emissions under §115 (indeed, any GHG regulation) is highly likely to be challenged in the courts. The same brevity in the section that grants the EPA the desired regulatory flexibility will be a weak point, likely a fatal one, in such a challenge. In other words, the same lack of specificity that allows the EPA to include offset provisions in regulation under these sections makes such regulation legally questionable-if those sections are used as the legal basis for general GHG regulation.
A different but related approach would be to regulate GHGs primarily under more established sections of the CAA, such as §110 (NAAQS) or §111 (NSPS), but to use §115 as a vehicle for international aspects of GHG regulation, potentially including offsets. §115 allows the EPA broad discretion to instruct states to regulate emissions when domestic regulation is insufficient to prevent harm to foreign countries. 32 The EPA might therefore conclude that even after domestic GHG regulation under §110 or §111 that other countries are still at risk and use §115 to impose additional regulatory requirements on states. The lack of specificity in §115 discussed above might allow the EPA to include international offsets in any such scheme.
This approach is more legally plausible than general GHG regulation under §115. First, the scale of regulation under §115 is smaller-the EPA would not be attempting to create an economywide GHG regulatory program under a four-paragraph, never-used section of the statute, but rather using that section as the basis for one or a few components of a larger program justified elsewhere in the statute. Second, those parts of the program that did fall under §115 would seem to fit better with the stated subject of that section-international air pollution.
Significant problems would remain, however, that make this approach legally suspect.
First, there is some tension between the language of §115 and offsets themselves. §115 is aimed at reductions in "pollutants emitted in the United States [that] cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country." 33 Offsets generally would have the opposite effect-they would allow states to export emissions (and, therefore, endangerment) to foreign countries. This is less true for GHGs since 31 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Association 531 U.S. 457, 468.
32 CAA §115(b). The foreign country must also grant the US reciprocal rights. 33 CAA §115(a). they are uniformly distributed globally-to the extent that offsets would result in lower global emissions, foreign countries would benefit just as much as the state in which the offset is used.
Still, offsets would not result in any reduction in "pollutants emitted in the United States" and therefore seem at odds with the plain language of §115. 34 The second problem is that courts may view an international offset program as an "elephant in a mousehole" just as they likely would a general GHG regulatory program. The former is smaller and less complex, to be sure, but is still likely to involve substantial new regulation and creation of a large international offset market. §115 may not provide sufficient legal basis on which to ground such a regulatory scheme.
The chief advantage of regulating GHGs primarily under well-tested provisions of the CAA and restricting the use of §115 to offsets is not, therefore, that the legal foundation for use of offsets or use of §115 for any GHG regulation are significantly stronger, but that these questions can be separated from the broader GHG regulatory scheme. If a court rules that §115 cannot be used in this way, the remainder of the GHG regulatory scheme can stand alonethough it would be more expensive.
Offsets as State-Level CAA Regulation
The previous sections have dealt with federal regulation under the CAA. CAA programs and enforcement are not restricted to the EPA or the federal government generally, however. The largest programs within the CAA for stationary-source regulation, the NSPS and NAAQS, have substantial state-level components, and the CAA is generally viewed as an exercise in "cooperative federalism." State governments do not face many of the restrictions placed on EPA by the CAA and separation-of-powers doctrines, and have substantial flexibility to implement policies to meet (or exceed) CAA requirements. It is therefore worth exploring whether states operating under the NAAQS or NSPS would be able to include international offsets in their component of CAA GHG regulation.
State Regulation Under the NAAQS
Under the NAAQS, states are responsible for creating state implementation plans, or SIPs, that detail how state regulatory efforts will result in air quality that meets or exceeds the national standards. The EPA must evaluate these plans and may approve or reject them-only if a SIP is rejected can the EPA directly implement regulation through a federal implementation plan, or FIP. The agency can also make "SIP calls" in which it requests revisions of existing SIPs. The EPA can make recommendations and retains final approval authority over SIPs, but cannot dictate the regulatory policies that states implement beyond determining whether they fulfill the requirements of the CAA. This process has in the past been a vehicle for integration of emissions trading schemes into NAAQS regulation, with the EPA issuing a "model" set of regulations that states may then implement in their SIPs. 35 The practical result is a full emissions The list is not exclusive, however. Certainly it is much easier to fit offsets into this statutory language than it to characterize them as "performance standards" under the NSPS. Rev. 1961 Rev. , 1967 Rev. (2006 Rev. -2007 should have the same effect on ambient GHG levels.
While legally plausible up to this point, this approach suffers from the same problems discussed in Section 3.1 with respect to GHG regulation under the NAAQS-the program is not a good fit for the GHG problem, and the fact that states have some flexibility does not change that very much. Just because states may be able to implement offsets or emissions trading does not solve larger problems such as the level at which a GHG NAAQS should be set or the futility of states being forced to plan to meet a standard for a global pollutant over which they have little individual control. As discussed in Section 4.3 below, implementation of offsets through state regulation also may create more legal problems, some of them constitutional, than it resolves. statute-as the EPA is directed to use. 40 The ambiguity of this term's definition under the CAA is discussed in Section 3.2 above, and the same analysis would apply to state regulation. As a result, prospects for integration of international offsets into state-driven §111(d) regulation of existing sources seem no greater than those for such integration into NSPS programs generally.
State Regulation Under the NSPS
Other Issues Surrounding State Regulation
While their quasi-sovereign status and the significant delegations of authority within CAA programs grant states greater regulatory flexibility, one must be careful not to ignore the restrictions that state law places on this flexibility. While states taken as a whole have great regulatory discretion, the same is true of the federal government. States only appear to have more discretion when compared to a single branch of the federal government or, as has been done in the sections above, with a single federal agency-EPA. In reality, SIPs, §111(d) performance standards, and other air pollution regulation by states must be approved by state legislatures or state agencies with sufficient authority delegated to them. Implementing a given regulatory scheme, such as international offsets, faces similar legal and ultimately political challenges at the state level as it does at the federal level. Analysis of the legality of international offsets under state law is beyond the scope of this memorandum, but will ultimately be highly relevant if state regulation is to be the vehicle for integrating these offsets into larger CAA regulation.
States also have the power to go beyond federal environmental regulation, as illustrated in the GHG context by California's AB32 measures 41 and regional initiatives such as RGGI. 42 In principle, states acting alone or in groups could implement GHG regulation that includes provisions for international offsets. This is true regardless of the form and content of federal CAA regulation of GHGs, or even in the absence of any federal regulation. Analysis of this possibility is similarly beyond the scope of this paper, but it is nevertheless relevant and legally (if not necessarily politically or practically) realistic.
CAA §111(d)(1)(A).
41 See California Air Resources Board, Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act (stating that, among other mandates, the California Air Resources Board "shall prepare and approve a scoping plan for achieving the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from sources or categories of sources of greenhouse gases by 2020" ) (available online at <http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32 /ab32.htm>).
42 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule (available online at < http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf>).
There is some potential that state regulations that incorporate international offsets, whether under delegated CAA authority or independent state authority, could be deemed to impermissibly interfere with the executive branch foreign affairs powers under the Constitution. 43 How this issue would play out would depend on the specific facts of the dispute.
States would be less likely to encounter constitutional problems if offsets can be characterized as contracts between private-party emitters, rather than as a treaty-like arrangement between a state and a foreign country. In general, however, this issue might never come before a court, as standing issues could present a significant barrier. 44
Conclusions
There appears to be no solid legal foundation for incorporation of international offsets in CAA GHG regulation. Offsets might be brought in through state-level CAA regulation. Because CAA §110(a)(2)(A) is the only CAA provision sufficiently broad to grant states the regulatory authority to incorporate offsets, the only offset-compatible CAA pathway open to the EPA would be the NAAQS. This pathway is generally perceived as a poor fit for the GHG problem.
Bringing in offsets through the more GHG-friendly NSPS program at either the federal or state (using CAA §111[d]) level requires creative interpretation of CAA language (specifically, whether offsets are "standards of performance") that may not hold up in court. State efforts to integrate international offsets under delegated CAA authority also require authorization under state law, and may be subject to challenge on constitutional grounds. Other CAA programs, such as §115, might allow the EPA to implement offset programs without state involvement, but regulation of GHGs under these programs at all is legally suspect.
As a result, it appears that new federal or at least state legislation is required to incorporate international offsets into U.S. GHG regulation. Use of offsets-and the cost savings they would likely bring-should therefore be considered a major advantage of comprehensive climate legislation over the CAA tools currently available to the EPA.
